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tled character of this area of the law by expressing no opinion
as to whether insane persons are required to conform for their
own protection to the standard of conduct which society demands
of sane persons. 26
In those cases where the mentally ill plaintiff was under the
care and control of a hospital at the time of the accident, the dis-
tinction between absolute insanity and less severe mental illness,
as well as the disagreement as to its effect upon the degree of
care expected of the plaintiff appears less significant.2 7 These
cases place considerable emphasis upon the special duty relation-
ship formed and tend to require a lower standard of care from
the patient for his own safety. However, since a hospital is not
an insurer, the patient is always required to exercise whatever
capacity he has for his own protection.2 8 Other than this some-
what more liberal approach when the patient-plaintiff is under
the care of a hospital, few generalizations can be deduced.
Thus, as the California Supreme Court expressed in the
Vistica case, in perhaps too succinct a manner, the jury has the
well-placed but difficult responsibility of weighing the patient's
capacity to protect himself with the hospital's concomitant duty
to guard the patient in determining the "responsible cause" of
the accident.
Chester H. Budz, Jr.
LOUISIANA LOAN LAWS
We are living in a society geared to a "buy-now-pay-later"
plan. Almost any consumer' can finance his goods and services
over an extended monthly payment plan. The financing of goods
and services is broadly categorized as consumer credit. The ar-
rangement for extension of credit may be made by the consumer
with the person or organization providing the goods or furnish-
ing the services or with some other entity which advances the
cash to the consumer to pay for such goods or services in return
for the consumer's promise to repay the advance. Consumer
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 464, caveat (1965).
27. See Lange v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 777 (N.D.N.Y. 1960; Emory
Univ. v. Lee, 97 Ga. App. 680, 104 S.E.2d 234 (1958) ; Doty v. State, 33 Misc.
2d 330, 226 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
28. DeMartini v. Alexander Sanitarium, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 442, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 564 (1961).
1. Any person who acquires goods or services which he or his family will use
primarily for purposes other than business or capital producing is, at least in re-
lation to such goods or services, a consumer.
[Vol. XXIX
NOTES
credit has skyrocketed from less than $1 billion at the end of
World War I to more than $69 billion in 1963,2 of which approxi-
mately one-third was granted by finance companies. 3
Finance Company, Loan Company, and Small Loan Company
are synonymous terms as understood by the average man. These
lending institutions represent, perhaps, one of the most misun-
derstood industries known to our society. The purpose of this
Note is to briefly explain the various statutes regulating interest
charges on loans in Louisiana, to point out areas where Louisiana
has failed to regulate interest, and to examine some problems
emanating from our usury laws.
Louisiana Small Loan Act
The Louisiana Small Loan Act 4 regulates the rate of interest
that may be charged on loans not exceeding $300.00. The Small
Loan licensee may collect interest at a rate not exceeding 31/2 %
a month on the principal not in excess of one hundred and fifty
dollars, and at a rate not exceeding 21/ % a month on the princi-
pal in excess of one hundred and fifty dollars up to a maximum
of three hundred dollars. In less complex terms, the statute per-
mits a lender to collect $124.56 on a loan of $100.00 provided the
loan is paid out in twelve installments of $10.38.5 Should the bor-
rower fail to make the monthly installments and elect to pay a
lump sum at the end of the year, he will owe $142.00. 6 On a loan
of $300.00, the borrower must repay $366.96 in twelve monthly
installments of $30.58 or one lump sum of $409.50 at the end of
a year.7
In recent years there has been a gradual decrease in Small
Loan volume. s This decrease can be attributed primarily to two
factors. The first and more obvious factor is that the borrower
2. B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 1 n.2 (1965).
3. 50 FED. RESERVE BULL. 376 (1964). Sales finance companies comprise
25%, or $13,523,000,000.00, and small loan companies 8.5%, or $4,590,000,000.00.
4. LA. R.S. 6:571-93 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 169, § 1.
5. The Small Loan Law is based on twelve, thirty-day months, thus permit-
ting the collection of five additional days interest.
6. The collection of $142.00 for a loan of $100.00 is why the label of "Forty-
Two Percenters" has been placed on the Small Loan Companies.
7. These rates were obtained from a rate chart based on the Louisiana Small
Loan Act and verified as correct by the State Banking Department.
8. 1966-1967 LA. STATE BANKING DEP'T 37Tfl BIENNIAL REPORT 79-8O. As
of December 31, 1967, there were 941 Small Loan companies licensed under the
Louisiana Small Loan Act with assets of $52,831,209.79. The total number of loans
made during the calendar year ending December 31, 1967, numbered 262,620 with
a total outlay of $51,920,641.22. The number of Small Loan companies increased
from 915 licensees in 1966 to 941 in 1967 while the number of loans made decreased
from 268,639 in 1966 to 262,620 in 1967.
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is no longer satisfied with a loan of $300.00; he needs more
money. Secondly, the lender is anxious to lend him more funds
in order to "discount" the interest because loans in excess of
$300.00 are much more lucrative.
Motor Vehicle Loan Laws
Motor vehicle loans are regulated by the Motor Sales Finance9
and Direct Vehicle Loan Companyl ° acts. 1 The finance rates and
provisions of these two acts are identica 1 2 except that the former
applies when the vendor of a motor vehicle finances the sale and
the latter applies when a lender places a chattel mortgage on a
motor vehicle.
Finance charge limitations under these acts are even more
complex than those under the Louisiana Small Loan Act. The
rates are broken down into four classes, according to the age of
the automobile.13 Class 1 applies to new motor vehicles and pro-
vides for a rate of 11/41% per month simple interest on the declin-
ing balance or $8.30 per $100.00 over a twelve-month installment
period. Class 2 applies to used vehicles not more than two years
old and provides for a rate of 13/4 % per month simple interest
on the declining balance or $11.73 per $100.00 over a twelve-
month installment period. Class 3 applies to vehicles not in class
1 or 2 but not more than four years old and provides for a rate
of 21/4, % per month simple interest on the declining balance or
$15.22 per $100.00 over a twelve-month installment period. Class
4 applies to all other motor vehicles not covered in classes 1, 2, or
3, and provides for a rate of 21/4 % per month simple interest on
9. LA. R.S. 6:951-64 (1950), as last amended, La. Acts 1966, No. 515, § 1.
10. LA. R.S. 6:970-76 (1950) as last amended, La. Acts 1966, No. 515, § 2.
11. To date, the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission has issued a total of
553 licenses under the Motor Sales Finance Act and 145 licenses under the Direct
Vehicle Loan Company Act. The Commission does not require a reporting by the
licensees of the number of loans or the total volume of loans.
12. LA. R.S. 6:974 (Supp. 1968) : "The provisions of U.S. 6:957, R.S. 6:958,
and U.S. 6.959 also shall apply to any direct vehicle loan company and any direct
vehicle loan."
13. LA. R.S. 6:957 (Supp. 1968). These rates are based on information re-
ceived from the office of M. F. Holland, Executive Director of Motor Vehicle
Commission, 234 Loyola Ave., New Orleans, La. The actual rates quoted are as
follows:
Class 1 8.30997 per annum add on.
Class 2 11.73652 per annum add on.
Class 3 15.22088 per annum add on.
Class 4 15.22088 per annum add on, plus a flat charge of $1.00 per month
not to exceed twelve months.
The Motor Vehicle Commission employs investigators to visit and audit licensees.
In addition to the investigators, the Commission also receives a microfilm on all
automobile titles issued by the state so it may determine whether a mortgage has
been recorded on the title.
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the declining balance, plus a flat charge of $1.00 per month up
to a maximum of twelve months, or $16.22 per $100.00 over a
twelve-month installment period.
The buyer or borrower has a right to prepay his loan and re-
ceive a refund of unearned interest. 14 The amount of refund shall
be at least 90 % as great a proportion of the finance charge (after
first deducting from such finance charge a charge of $25.00) as
the sum of the monthly time balance (beginning one month after
the month in which prepayment is made) bears to the sum of all
the monthly time balances under the schedule of payments in the
contract; this method of refund upon prepayment is commonly
referred to as the "Rule of 78" or the "Sum of the Digits" refund
method.15 After the contract has run twelve months, the $25.00
may not be deducted prior to computing the refund of unearned
interest.16
Discount Loans
Loans in excess of $300.00 made with security other than mo-
tor vehicles are commonly referred to as "discount" loans. The
name is derived from a practice, sanctioned by our courts,17
adopted to avoid the Louisiana usury statute.18
The legal rate of interest that may be charged on loans in ex-
cess of $300.00 is 8 % per annum.1 9 However, if the lender pre-
14. LA. R.S. 6:958, as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 139, § 1.
15. On a 24-month contract with an interest charge of $300.00, the refund of
unearned interest would be as follows:
If the contract is prepaid in the sixth month, the debtor is entitled to 90% of
57% of the interest charge ($300) after first deducting $25.00, or a total refund
of $128.25 ($300-$25 x 57% x 90% = Refund).
If the contract is prepaid in the twelfth month, the debtor is entitled to 90%
of 26% of the interest charge ($300) after first deducting $25, or a total refund
of $58.50 ($300- $25 x 26% x 90%- Refund).
16. LA. R.S. 6:958 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 139 § 1.
17. Customer 'borrowed $9,933.70 and executed promissory note for $15,000.00,
bearing 8% per annum interest from date until paid, payable in $400.00 monthly
installments. Interest on note "from date" was illegal but principal of $15,000.00
was legal. Mayfield v. Nunn, 239 La. 1021, 121 So.2d 65 (1960).
"[P]arties would be permitted to recover usurious interest by merely capital-
izing it with transactions foreign to the principal obligation and by this means cir-
cumvent the law." Vosbein v. Leopold, 230 La. 21, 28, 87 So.2d 715, 717 (1956).
A note acquired 'by a finance company at a discount of 11% on its face value,
but conditioned to bear interest at 8% from maturity, "since it does not bear more
than 8% interest after maturity it cannot be said to carry usurious interest." Gen-
eral Securities Co. v. Jumonville, 216 La. 681, 686, 44 So.2d 702, 703 (1950).
Customer borrowed $2000.00 and executed note for $3744.00. The court
stated that there is no limit to the amount of capitalized interest which may be
added to the principal on a note. Clasen v. Excel Fin. Causeway, Inc., 170 So.2d
924 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
18. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2924.
19. Id.
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computes the interest and includes it in the face amount of the
note, there is no limit to the amount of capitalized interest which
may be charged and added to the principal of the note.2 0 The
lender may charge 8 %, or he may charge 800 % ; as long as he
includes the interest in the note, he is not guilty of usurious lend-
ing. The usury statute makes a nonsensical distinction between
"interest" and "discount." However, in practical terms the re-
sult of both is the same; i.e., the borrower is paying a charge for
the use of the money. The distinction is made according to the
manner in which the lender constructs his note. If the lender
draws the note for the exact amount of money borrowed, he may
not collect interest at a rate in excess of 8 % per annum. How-
ever, if the lender draws the face amount of the note for the
amount of cash loaned plus interest and whatever "other charges"
he chooses to add to the note, he is not charging interest but is
charging discount and there is no ceiling on the amount of dis-
count charged. The practice of lending money at exorbitant dis-
count rates has been attacked in the courts to no avail.21 It seems
clear that unless and until legislation is enacted to regulate the
amount of interest that may be charged on discount loans, the
courts must continue to sanction unconscionable and usurious
lending practices.2 2
20. Vosbein v. Leopold, 230 La. 21, 87 So.2d 715 (1956).
21. Mayfield v. Nunn, 239 La. 1021, 121 So.2d 65 (1960) ; General Securities
Co. v. Jumonville, 216 La. 681, 44 So.2d 702 (1950) ; Time Fin. Co. v. Louis,
152 So.2d 248 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
In Clasen v. Excel Fin. Causeway, Inc., 170 So.2d 924, 925 n.3 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1965), the court permitted lender to recover the face amount of note and
stated that there is no limit to amount of capitalized interest which may be added
to the principle of a note and that a proportionate rebate of interest on a note
paid prior to expiration of its full term is required only when prepayment was
initiated by the creditor. The court commented on Louisiana Civil Code Article
2924: "In this connection we might add that the development of the law of usury
in Louisiana has -been slow and unsatisfactory. The innumerable statutes that were
passed and made a part of this article of the Code have unnecessarily complicated
the subject. It appears that many of the cases emanating from our appellate courts
are in error in their conclusions relative to usury. In any event, a statute should
be enacted placing a maximum on the charge for the use of money to cover dis-
count and capitalized interest, and it should be written so that its meaning is
crystal clear."
In Williams v. Alphonse Mortgage Co., 144 So.2d 600, 602 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962), the court stated: "Counsel for appellant would point out that the rate of
interest exacted by the defendant was exorbitant and unconscionable. From this,
we would conclude we are urged to consider the inequity of the situation from her
standpoint and, on the basis of equity, to grant her relief. However, 'The distinc-
tion of laws into odious laws and laws entitled to favor, with a view of narrowing
or extending their construction, cannot be made by those whose duty it is to in-
terpret them.' (LA. CIv. CODE art. 20).
"In civil matters, it is only in the absence of expressed law that the courts may
provide and decide according to equity. (LA. CIv. CODE art. 21.).
"In the instant case, the law is expressed; the jurisprudence is in accord
therewith."
22. Numerous attempts have been made to pass laws regulating discount and
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The practice of charging exorbitant interest rates on discount
loans is only a small portion of the story. As often happens, the
borrower is unable to pay his installments promptly each month
and must make arrangements to postpone the past due payment.
He is often willing to pay the lender an "extension fee"or "late
charge" in order to delay legal action. Although cases2 3 have held
that these charges are tantamount to interest payments and are
usurious if they exceed the maximum legal rate of 8 % per an-
num, the common practice among some finance companies is to
charge what the traffic will bear. The borrower is either un-
aware that he is paying an illegal amount of interest or simply
submits to the charge in order to receive the service.
2 4
Another area of the discount loan business costly to the bor-
rower is prepayment of his loan. Suppose the borrower signs a
note for $1,000.00, including capitalized interest of $400.00, re-
payable in twenty-four monthly installments; the borrower de-
cides the next day he does not need the money and attempts to
prepay the loan. Our courts have taken the position that the pay-
ment of a note can be made before maturity only by consent of
both debtor and creditor.2 5 Therefore, the borrower has no right
to demand a refund of unearned interest and must pay the face
amount of the note. The result is different, however, if the cred-
itor elects to accelerate maturity. The leading case of Berger v.
DeSalvo2 6 held that the holder of the note must give a pro rata
interest without attaining final approval. The most recent attempt was defeated by
the House of Representatives in the Special Session of 1968. This attempt followed
Louisiana Ilouse Bill No. 556 (hereafter La. H.B. 556) which was vetoed by the
governor on June 29, 1968. The governor stated in vetoing the bill: "No person
has any business borrowing money if he has to pay the interest rates which this
bill allows." This statement seems inappropriate because, at the present time, in-
terest rates are not regulated, and this bill would have placed a ceiling on the
amount of interest that could be charged. Without this bill, the loan sharks can
continue to thrive and charge whatever rate they can extract. The maximum rate
that could have been charged under this bill amounted to approximately $20.00 per
$100.00. The bill had passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 97-0 and
the Senate by a margin of 30-4. The State of Louisiana lost a much needed law
in this veto.
23. Chadwick v. Menard, 104 La. 38, 28 So. 933 (1900) ; Consolidated Loans,
Inc. v. Smith, 190 So.2d 522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
24. La. H.B. 556 would regulate extension fees, but the rate is far in excess
of the now legal 8% per annum.
25. In re Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 189 La. 813, 817, 180
So. 646, 647 (1938). "[T]be maker of a note has no right to pay the same before
maturity without the consent of the holder."
In State v. Ratzbrug, 215 La. 295, 298, 40 So.2d 395, 396 (1949), the court
stated: "Under the provisions of Article 1945 of the Revised Civil Code parties
are governed by their legal agreements and the courts are bound to give legal effect
to the contracts according to the true intent of the parties, which intent is to be
determined .by the words used in the contracts."
Garrison v. Hebert, 144 So.2d 916 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
26. 156 So.2d 323 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied.
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refund of unearned interest if he elects to demand a payoff prior
to maturity. In Berger, the defendant signed a note for $13,-
000.00, of which $3,000.00 was capitalized interest, on May 6,
1959, to be repaid in installments over a two-year period. The
note provided for acceleration of maturity of the entire note at
the holder's option for failure to pay any installment punctually,
and provided for 8 % interest per annum from the accelerated
maturity date. The borrower failed to pay the first installment
when due; and the holder elected to treat the entire balance as
mature and due upon demand. The defendant had only six
months' use of the $10,000.00 prior to the holder's decision to
exercise his option to accelerate the balance. The court, relying
on an old case,2 7 held that the holder must return the capitalized
interest unearned on the acceleration date. 8 By comparison, the
same court held in another case 29 that when the maker elects to
prepay the note, there is no right to demand a refund of the un-
earned interest. The court stated:
"[I]t appears to be well settled in the jurisprudence that a
holder of a promissory note may collect the face of the note,
notwithstanding that such note may include a greater dis-
count than 8% per annum, provided that such note does not
bear a greater rate of interest than 8 % per annum after
maturity." 0
The distinction here is: if the holder of the note elects to mature
the note, he must refund a pro rata amount of the unearned in-
terest; but if the maker decides to prepay the note, he has no
right to demand refund of this same unearned interest.31
27. Williams' Heirs v. Douglass, 47 La. Ann. 1277, 17 So. 805 (1895).
28. La. H.B. 556 would have required the creditor to refund unearned in-
terest except in situations where the creditor sues for the balance. The refund
method was identical to the method used in the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act
(LA. R.S. 6:958), as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 139, § 1) and the Direct Vehi-
cle Loan Companies Act (LA. R.S. 6:974 (Supp. 1968).
The governor, in his veto message, objected to the provision, because it would
in effect overrule Berger by permitting recovery of the entire note with no rebate
when the creditor elects to accelerate maturity by filing suit. This provision does
seem to be inequitable since it would encourage some to file suit on a note in order
to get around the rebate statute.
29. Williams v. Alphonse Mortgage Co., 144 So.2d 600 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962).
30. Id. at 602.
31. Gulf Acceptance Loan Corp. v. Demas, 205 So.2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1968). Defendant borrowed $650 from plaintiff on November 15, 1966, and exe-
cuted a promissory note for $977.70 to be repaid over a period of thirty monthly
installments. Defendant defaulted on his first payment and suit was filed on Jan-
uary 24, 1967. A demand was made for the entire $977.70 plus attorney fees of
8% per annum interest from date of default. Defendant did not contest -the suit, a
default judgment was entered and time for appeal passed. In denying a rebate and
unearned interest, the court recognized the right to a refund but the right was lost




Credit sales 32 are of equal concern to the consuming public.
Buying on the installment plan has become a way of life for most
Americans. The poor are especially vulnerable to installment
buying and are seldom concerned with carrying charges. At the
present time, credit sales are exempt from Louisiana's usury
laws."
A very important but usually unnoticed characteristic of the
installment sale is that very often a finance charge is included in
the cash price. The merchant is not required to state his cost of
the merchandise; therefore, the consumer is unaware of the
time-price differential. In regard to the retail merchant who sells
his merchandise on time, four serious questions need to be con-
sidered: (1) Should he be required to disclose in writing the
amount and nature of all charges; (2) Should his retail price be
regulated; (3) Should he be required to refund unearned interest
when the purchaser prepays his account; and (4) Should he be
required to subtract the time-price differential when the cus-
tomer pays cash. 34 Grievous evils exist in the field of credit sales.
The merchant is permitted to "mark-up" his merchandise with
no limitation and then charge a time-price differential that is
not regulated. Very often the merchant sells the sales contract to
a finance company at a discounted rate. In most instances3 5 the
finance company becomes a holder in due course obviating the
personal defense of redhibition due to defective merchandise.36
32. See generally Comment, 24 LA. L. REV. 822 (1964), containing an in-
depth discussion of usury as it relates to credit sales.
33. In Motes v. Van Wagner, 188 So.2d 704, 705 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966),
the court stated: "Civil Code art. 2924 does not apply to a bona fide credit sale of
property; in the absence of fraud or intention to defeat the law relative to usury,
a vendor and a purchaser may validly agree on a credit price in excess of the cash
price for the same article, even though the added price for the credit sale over the
cash price exceeds the legal interest rate." See Mills v. Crocker, 9 La. Ann. 334(1854).
34. La. H.B. 556 did not contain a provision to regulate interest on credit
sales. This writer submits that any legislation directed at regulation of discount
and interest on loans should also include regulation of discount, interest, and car-
rying charges on credit sales.
35. See LA. R.S. 7:51-59 (1950).
36. Credit transactions between sellers and lenders and buyers and borrowers
are to be regulated by the new Consumer Credit Protection Act, more commonly
known as Truth-in-Lending. The following statement appeared in the June 1968
issue of Louisiana Consumer: "A major victory for consumers was won with the
passage by both houses of Congress of the Federal Truth in Lending Act on April
22, 1968. The act was signed into law by the President on April 29, 1968, and
most of its provisions will become effective on July 1, 1969.
"The most significant feature of the new law is the provisions which require
lenders and retail creditors to provide their customers full, honest and comparable
information about the cost of credit. In particular, the act requires that con-
sumers be told the effective annual rate of interest they are being charged, thus
1969]
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Conclusion
The future of the loan industry in Louisiana is uncertain. Al-
most everyone agrees that finance companies are necessary, but
they disagree as to rates, pre-payment refunds, collection meth-
ods, and miscellaneous charges. What effect, if any, the federal
Truth-in-Lending Act 37 will have on loan companies is unknown.
The Act does not contain rate controls nor does it provide for a
refund of unearned interest.3s
There may, however, be hope for the unwary borrower should
Louisiana adopt the Uniform Commercial Code.3 9 The UCC has a
provision 40 that could enable the court to find as a matter of law
that the discounting of exorbitant interest is unconscionable and
thereby take appropriate action. The outcome of the court's find-
ing would depend entirely upon their definition of the term
"unconscionable." The UCC does not attempt to define the term,
thus leaving much discretion in the courts.
Herschel C. Adcock
MANDAMUS-COMPELLING AN OFFICIAL TO PERFORM
DISCRETIONARY DUTY
Plaintiffs, desiring to complete a course in barber college,
were unable to fulfill the requirements within the time alloted
by law' and sought an extension from the Louisiana State
Board of Barber Examiners. The Board, "in its discretion,"'2
refused to allow the requested extension and plaintiffs brought
enabling them, for the first time in most states, to actually have a meaningful op-
portunity to shop for the best credit buy."
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (1968).
38. A bill such as La. H.B. 556, even though it contained some inequitable
provisions, would have been a welcome relief.
39. Louisiana is the only state that has not adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code; however, the Louisiana Law Institute is presently studying the UCC with
an eye toward its possible adoption by Louisiana.
40. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302: "(1) If the court as a matter of
law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable
at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may
so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscion-
able result.
"(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect
to aid the court in making the determination."
1. LA. R. S. 36:363 (1950).
2. Id. 36:366 gives the Board the power to extend the time permitted for com-
pletion of the required course. To give, or not to give, an extension is within the
Board's discretion, but it may only grant an extension upon a showing of good
cause.
